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I. INTRODUCTION
The development of common-law tort liability, especially since
the late 1950s and early 1960s, has broken many of the barriers to
plaintiff recovery. The abrogation of the privity requirement, the
evolution of the discovery rule, and the advent of strict liability
were primary agents in this "assault upon the citadel."' These de-
velopments have threatened many potential tort defendants, par-
ticularly members of the manufacturing and construction indus-
tries and the medical profession. In response to lobbying pressure
from these groups, many state legislatures have adopted measures
to limit tort recoveries. One of the measures most popular among
1. See generally Turner, The Counter-Attack to Retake the Citadel Continues: An
Analysis of the Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose in Products Liability, 46 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 449, 451-55 (1981) (discussing the evolution of products liability law); cf. Comment,
Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and Builders-Blueprints for Non-Action, 18
CATH. UL. REv. 361, 361-64 (1969) (discussing the evolution of architect's liability).
2. For a discussion of some of the measures not addressed in this Note, particularly in
the area of medical malpractice, see Smith, Battling a Receding Tort Frontier: Constitu-
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defendants has been the enactment of statutes of repose, which re-
strict the time period in which a plaintiff can bring suit.3 Ulti-
mately, a statute of repose may bar a plaintiff's claim even before
his injury occurs.
Statutes of repose are highly controversial and have become a
subject of much litigation and commentary.4 In particular, these
statutes have faced various constitutional attacks. This Note ex-
amines the divergent approaches state courts have taken recently
to statutes of repose and concludes that this diversity is appropri-
ate in our federalist system. Part II of this Note defines a "statute
of repose" and outlines the content of typical statutes in the prod-
ucts liability, construction, and medical malpractice areas. Part II
also considers the principal arguments in favor of and against stat-
utes of repose. Part III discusses the arguments and lines of analy-
sis in three constitutional areas: equal protection, due process, and
"open courts" or "access to courts." Part IV examines the effect of
state constitutional law on statutes of repose and discusses possible
directions courts may take in future decisions. Part IV then ad-
dresses two of the major debates this issue raises: first, whether
Congress should adopt a federal statute of repose, and, second, the
degree of deference courts should show legislatures in this area.
Part V concludes that the entire controversy surrounding statutes
of repose ultimately concerns a choice between promoting eco-
nomic interests and preserving individuals' rights of recovery, a
choice that should be left to the states.
II. STATUTES OF REPOSE
A. Defining "Statute of Repose"
The term "statute of repose" can create analytical difficulties
because it lacks a precise definition and often is confused with
"statute of limitations."' 5 Although both prescribe the time period
tional Attacks on Medical Malpractice Laws, 38 OKLA. L. REV. - (1985); Abraham, Med-
ical Malpractice Reform: A Preliminary Analysis, 36 MD. L. REv. 489 (1977).
3. McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Stat-
utes of Repose, 30 A. U.L. RE v. 579, 579 (1981).
4. Professor McGovern lists some of the many articles that have commented on stat-
utes of repose. See McGovern, supra note 3, at 584 n.27. Professor McGovern's article
stands out as a very thorough study of the pre-1981 law of statutes of repose. The flood of
litigation on the subject has continued since then, however, and this Note examines the
many state and federal court rulings that have come down since Professor McGovern's
article.
5. In a general sense, a statute of repose and a statute of limitations are one in the
same. Indeed, Black's Law Dictionary defines them as such: "Statutes of limitation are stat-
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within which plaintiffs must bring suit, important differences exist
between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose. Statutes of
limitations limit the time in which a plaintiff may bring suit after
the cause of action accrues, whereas statutes of repose potentially
bar the plaintiff's suit before the cause of action arises. 6 For exam-
ple, a products liability statute may provide that an action must be
brought within six years of injury but in no event may a plaintiff
commence an action more than ten years after the date on which
the product was first purchased. 7 The six year period is a statute of
limitations; the ten year period is a statute of repose. The effect of
the statute of repose is clear in a situation in which a plaintiff is
injured in the eleventh year after purchasing a product. Because
the ten year statute of repose has expired, a cause of action cannot
accrue, and the plaintiff is barred from bringing suit, even though
the six year statute of limitations would not have barred the
action.
Not all statutes of repose operate identically. In some statutes
of repose, the statutory period begins to run at a different time
from traditional statutes of limitations.8 Other statutes of repose
set an outer limit on the length of a statute of limitations that has
a discovery provision.9 Still others combine these concepts.10 Gen-
erally, for the purpose of this Note, the term "statute of repose"
refers to a statute that places an additional prescriptive period
upon the time in which a plaintiff may bring an action under a
traditional statute of limitations.
This Note considers products liability, medical malpractice,
and construction statutes of repose" and illustrates that not all
statutes operate identically. 2 Products liability statutes of repose' s
utes of repose, and. . . prescribe the periods within which actions may be brought. . ....
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 835 (5th ed. 1979).
6. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, Dykes, Goodenberger, Bower &
Clancy, 740 F.2d 1362, 1367 (6th Cir. 1984).
7. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (1980).
8. See infra notes 14-16, 22-23, 30-31, and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(16) (1983) (providing that a two year statute of
limitations begins to run when a plaintiff reasonably should have discovered the injury, but
in no event may an action commence more than 10 years after the elements of the action
have accrued).
10. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982) ("[T]he time for the com-
mencement of action shall be three years from the date of injury or one year after the plain-
tiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury,
whichever occurs first. In no event shall the time ... exceed three years unless . . ").
11. "Construction statutes of repose" refers to statutes limiting actions arising out of
defects in improvements to real property.
12. See infra notes 14-34 and accompanying text.
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typically begin running on the date of purchase, 4 the date of first
use, 15 or when the product leaves the manufacturer's control.'
Products liability statutes of repose protect varying groups of de-
fendants, but most of the statutes include manufacturers and sell-
ers. 7 Many of these statutes provide exceptions in cases of inten-
tional concealment or misrepresentation, 18 express warranty, 19 or
products such as asbestos that pose unique discovery problems.20
Medical malpractice statutes of repose2' generally begin to run
from the date of injury,2 s or the date of the act or omission that
constitutes the alleged malpractice. 3 Defendants protected by
these statutes may include all licensed health care providers,24 or
only a specific group, such as physicians, surgeons, registered
nurses, dentists, optometrists, hospitals, nursing homes, and clin-
ics. 2 5 Many of these statutes provide exceptions in cases of inten-
13. See generally Comment, Statutes of Repose in Products Liability: Death Before
Conception? 37 Sw. L.J. 665, 680-84 (1983).
14. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 105-106(b)(2) (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103
(1980).
15. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-502(c) (Supp. 1984).
16. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(1) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (1977) (providing a limitation of six years after first purchase or 10
years after the manufacture date).
17. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-403(3) (Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
15-2-12.1 (1984).
18. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-1403(2)(b)(2) (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
7.72.060(b)(ii) (Supp. 1985).
19. See, e.g., ARiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 6-1403(2)(b)(1)
(Supp. 1984).
20. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-502(b) (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 6-1403(2)(b)(4)
(Supp. 1984); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.905(3) (1983).
21. See generally D. LouisEuL & H. WILLIAMS, 1 MEDICAL MALPRACTCE 13.14-.64
(1984 & Supp. 1984).
22. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-564(A) (1982) (The Arizona Supreme Court
has distinguished the "date of the injury" from the date on which the negligent act occurred
and has held that "date of the injury" means the date on which the injury manifests itself.
See Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz 69, - 688 P.2d 961, 967 (1984) (en banc)); CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982).
23. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4)(b) (West 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2305.11(B) (Page 1981).
24. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4)(b)
(West 1982). Most statutes define "health care provider" for the purposes of the statute,
and these definitions vary. See generally D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE §§ 8.1-.5 (1973
& Supp. 1977).
25. See D. HARNEY, supra note 24, at 250-51. E.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-482 (1975) (cover-
ing anyone licensed to practice medicine or dentistry, any licensed hospital or physician's or
dentist's office or clinic, any medical or dental professional corporation, association or part-
nership, and any employee who is directly involved in delivering health care services); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-80-105 (Supp. 1984) (covering any person licensed to practice medicine,
chiropratic medicine, nursing, physical therapy, podiatry, veterinary medicine, dentistry,
630
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tional concealment or misrepresentation,"6 foreign objects left in
the body,2 7 or minors under a given age.28
Construction statutes of repose29 usually begin to run on the
date of substantial completion, 0 acceptance, or first use of the im-
provement.' These statutes cover varying classes of defendants.
Some statutes are relatively exclusive, primarily protecting profes-
sional architects, contractors, and engineers,32 while other statutes
have a broader reach, protecting materialmen, laborers, and other
workers participating in the construction.3 The broadest statutes
include everyone involved in the construction and owners or per-
sons in possession of the improvement.3 4 In response to decisions
holding that some statutes of repose violate equal protection guar-
antees, legislatures have included an increasingly broad group of
potential defendants when fashioning recent construction statutes
of repose.3"
pharmacy, optometry, or other healing arts, and any licensed or certified hospital, health
care facility or other institution for treating the sick or injured); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1(9)
(West Supp. 1984) (covering any licensed physician, surgeon, osteopath, dentist, podiatrist,
optometrist, pharmacist, chiropractor, nurse, or licensed hospital).
26. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982); OR. REv. STAT. § 12-110(4)
(1983).
27. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 3-1103
(Supp. 1984).
28. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2305.11(B) (Page 1981).
29. See generally Sisson & Kelley, Statutes of Limitations for the Design and Build-
ing Professions - Will They Survive Constitutional Attack?, 49 INS. COUNS. J. 243 (1982).
30. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 337.1(a) (West 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20-2
(Burns Supp. 1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-640 (Law. Co-op 1977).
31. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(c) (West 1982) (providing that the time will
begin to run on the date of acceptance if that date is later than the date of substantial
completion); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.5839(1) (West 1968). The term "improvement"
refers to improvements of real property. Houses, factories, and other buildings clearly are
"improvements." See Sisson & Kelley, supra note 29, at 244. Courts also have held that the
installation of component parts of these structures are improvements. See id. In addition,
highways and bridges may be improvements. See id.
32. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584a(a) (West Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
95.11(3)(c) (West 1982).
33. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(5)(b)(9) (1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.155 (West
1983).
34. See, e.g., HAwAII REV. STAT. § 657-8 (Supp. 1982); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 541-051
(West Supp. 1984).
35. See Shibuya v. Architects Hawaii Ltd., 65 Hawaii 26, 647 P.2d 276 (1982) (tracing
a series of amendments to Hawaii's construction statute of repose).
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B. Arguments For and Against Statutes of Repose
Statutes of repose have created controversy in the legal com-
munity, generating a great deal of litigation and commentary. This
section outlines some of the principal arguments in favor of and
against statutes of repose. Justifications that proponents cite for
limiting causes of action include avoiding stale or frivolous claims36
and promoting judicial economy.3 7 These concerns are especially
relevant in products liability, medical malpractice, and construc-
tion liability cases because accurately tracing defects or injuries to
particular defendants in these situations can be very difficult. As
time passes, records are lost, memories fade, technology advances,
and intervening circumstances arise, creating problems for a defen-
dant attempting to present a proper defense in court.38
Perhaps the most noted justification for statutes of repose is
the desire to alleviate the insurance problem facing manufacturers,
the medical profession, and the construction industry.39 Responsi-
bility for older products, latent medical problems, and "perma-
nent" or durable improvements expose these groups to abnormally
long periods of potential liability and unusually large numbers of
potential plaintiffs.40 Proponents contend that this "long-tail"
problem is the principal culprit in the alleged "insurance crisis. '4 1
Theoretically, by cutting off a defendant's liability after a given
number of years, statutes of repose lead to more certain liability
36. See Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, - , 437 N.E.2d 514, 520 (1982) (quoting
Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 201, 293 A.2d 662, 667-68 (1972) ("There
comes a time when a [defendant] ought to be secure in his reasonable expectation that the
slate has been wiped clean of ancient obligations, and he ought not to be called on to resist a
claim 'when evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared.' ").
37. McGovern, supra note 3, at 594.
38. See Sisson & Kelley, supra note 29, at 250 (discussing architects' defense
problems).
39. See Turner, supra note 1, at 449 (discussing the problem of skyrocketing products
liability insurance costs); Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, _, 688 P.2d 961, 976-77
(1984) (en banc) (examining the social costs of rising medical malpractice insurance premi-
ums); Note, People Who Live in Glass Houses Should Not Build in Vermont: The Need for
a Statute of Limitations for Architects, 9 VT. L. REv. 101, 130 (1984) (addressing the insur-
ance problems facing architects who are subject to indefinite liability).
40. See Turner, supra note 1, at 450 (citing THE RESEARCH GROUP, INC., INTERAGENCY
TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, 5 PRODUCT LIABILITY: LEGAL STUDY 2, at VII-21 (1977))
(discussing the products liability "long-tail". problem); Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., -
Colo. -, 655 P.2d 822 (1982) (discussing "long-tail" problems in the construction
industry).
41. Turner, supra note 1, at 449-50 ("The most significant factor alleged to be the
cause of the nationwide products liability insurance problem is the responsibility of manu-
facturers and sellers for older products-the 'long tail' problem.").
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and thus provide greater actuarial precision in setting insurance
rates.'2 More certain liability and stabilized insurance rates in turn
facilitate efficient business planning and ultimately benefit busi-
nessmen, professionals, consumers, and the economy.,3
In addition to these general arguments, proponents often as-
sert reasons why statutes of repose are particularly apt for specific
groups of defendants. For example, in products liability cases, pro-
ponents of statutes of repose argue that without the statutes, man-
ufacturers could be held to current design standards for products
manufactured long ago.' 4 Furthermore, the threat of a plaintiff of-
fering evidence of the manufacturer's design changes against him
at trial could discourage the manufacturer from making safer and
more efficient products.'" In the construction area, the architect
faces particular problems in maintaining quality control over his
designs before construction and safety standards after construc-
tion.'6 Similarly, in the medical malpractice area, the physician
must cope with the uncertainties inherent in any medical situation,
even though he cannot maintain control over a patient who no
longer is under his care.'7
Opponents of statutes of repose counter these justifications
with equally persuasive arguments. One court recently noted that
it is illogical to bar a claim as "stale" before the claim ever ac-
crues.48 Critics also argue that the "passage of time" problem 9 is
not unique to products liability, medical malpractice, or construc-
tion liability cases. Almost every type of litigation poses the same
problems.50 Furthermore, plaintiffs face the same evidentiary
42. See MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 110, Analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714,
62,733 (1979).
43. See Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, - , 688 P.2d 961, 976 (1984) (en banc)
("[T]he compelling interest of the state in reducing malpractice premiums must be found, if
at all, in the state's interest in making quality medical care available to the public at a
reasonable cost.").
44. See Thornton v. Mono Mfg., 99 Il. App. 3d 722, 725, 425 N.E.2d 522, 524 (1981).
45. For a more thorough discussion of manufacturers' particular problems, see Mc-
Govern, supra note 3, at 588-95, and Turner, supra note 1.
46. See infra notes 80, 83. For a more thorough discussion of architects' particular
problems, see Note, supra note 39.
47. For a more thorough discussion of physicians' particular problems, see D. HARNEY,
supra note 24.
48. Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470, 472, 298 S.E.2d 484,486 (1983); see also Phillips, An
Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products Liability Statutes of Limitations, 56 N.C. L. REv.
663, 676 (1978) (rejecting the assertion that a claim is frivolous merely because it concerns a
latent defect).
49. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
50. See McGovern, supra note 3, at 590 (discussing the "passage of time" problem in
1985]
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problems as time passes and ultimately must carry the burden of
proof.51 Thus, opponents of statutes of repose argue that the pas-
sage of time and these evidentiary problems actually may work in
the defendant's favor. For example, in a products liability case, the
longer the plaintiff uses a product without the product showing
any defects, the greater the inference that there was no defect.2
Critics also maintain that if a defendant's negligence caused dam-
age, then the mere passage of time should not excuse the defen-
dant from liability.
53
Opponents of statutes of repose also attack the validity of the
insurance crisis argument, citing studies that have shown that the
"long-tail" problem is relatively insignificant. For example, an In-
surance Services Office survey found that ninety-seven percent of
all products liability claims arose within six years of purchase. 4
Thus, a statute of repose actually may not reduce insurance
rates.5 Indeed, one legal study has concluded that "none of the
[doctrines] existing in tort law appears significant enough individu-
ally or in combination to be directly responsible for the alleged
products liability insurance problem."5 86 More recent studies have
strengthened these contentions.57 These studies show that the in-
surance problem never reached "crisis" proportions58 and that the
stabilization of insurance rates has solved the problem. 9
Finally, critics counter some of the arguments in favor of pro-
tecting particular groups of defendants with statutes of repose. For
products liability).
51. See Johnson, Products Liability "Reform": A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C. L.
REv. 677, 691 (1978).
52. Note, The Utah Product Liability Limitation of Action: An Unfair Resolution of
Competing Concerns, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 149, 152 (1979).
53. Turner, supra note 1, at 459 n.69 (quoting Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166
S.E.2d 173 (1969)).
54. Turner, supra note 1, at 450 n.11 (citing INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCT
LIABILrrY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY: A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 81-83 (1977));
cf. Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, -, 688 P.2d 961, 978 (1984) (en banc) (noting that
surveys indicate that over 88% of all medical malpractice claims are reported within the
first two years following the injury and 97% are reported within four years).
55. Turner, supra note 1, at 459 (citing INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LiABiL-
ITY: INSURANCE STUDY 4-92 to -94 (1977)).
56. Johnson, supra note 51, at 679 (citing INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIA-
BILITY, 3 THE RESEARCH GROUP, INC., FINAL REPORT OF THE LEGAL STUDY 99-100 (1977)).
57. See generally Page & Stephens, The Product Liability Insurance "Crisis"
Causes, Nostrums and Cures, 13 CAP. U.L. REv. 387 (1984).
58. Id.
59. See Dworkin, Federal Reform of Product Liability Law, 57 TuL. L. REV. 602, 618-
19 (1983).
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example, in the area of products liability, opponents note that one
fixed limitation period is inappropriate because the safe, useful
lives of products vary considerably."0 Furthermore, experience has
shown that safety problems often are disregarded until social and
economic pressures force designers and manufacturers to design
and produce safer products.6 1 An absolute liability cut off after a
certain number of years would reduce those incentives to achieve
long-term product safety.62
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Plaintiffs attack statutes of repose on a number of constitu-
tional grounds, frequently alleging equal protection, due process,
and open courts violations. Plaintiffs often raise more than one of
these challenges in the same case. Although courts do not always
give each issue thorough or distinct treatment, the present analysis
treats these three constitutional claims separately. This part of the
Note examines the major constitutional arguments, analyses, and
conclusions asserted in recent cases and identifies continuing
trends and recent developments.6 "
A. Equal Protection
Plaintiffs often challenge statutes of repose on the ground that
they violate the equal protection clause by creating arbitrary and
unreasonable distinctions between classes of defendants or classes
of plaintiffs. Discrimination between groups of defendants is the
most frequent equal protection challenge asserted." Distinctions
between defendants are readily apparent on the face of most stat-
utes of repose,65 but the distinctions between classes of plaintiffs
are less readily apparent. One challenged distinction is between
plaintiffs injured before and after the expiration of the statutory
period.6 A second distinction that these statutes make is in favor-
60. Phillips, supra note 48, at 676.
61. McGovern, supra note 3, at 590.
62. Johnson, supra note 51, at 691.
63. For a discussion of earlier cases treating these constitutional issues, see McGov-
ern, supra note 3, at 600-20.
64. See, e.g., Van Den Hul v. Baltic Farmers Elevator Co., 716 F.2d 504 (8th Cir.
1983). For a discussion of the standing issue that challenge raises, see McGovern, supra note
3, at 618-20. The equal protection clause provides: "No State shall... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 17, 24-25, 32-34.
66. See, e.g., Van Den Hul v. Baltic Farmers Elevator Co., 716 F.2d 504 (8th Cir.
1983); Shessel v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56, 316 S.E.2d 155 (1984); Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470, 298
19851
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ing plaintiffs injured by newer products over plaintiffs injured by
older products.17 A third challenged distinction is between plain-
tiffs whose injuries fall within a statutory exception and plaintiffs
whose injuries are not excepted.6 8 A fourth distinction arises be-
tween plaintiffs with injuries caused by negligence that is pro-
tected by the statute, such as defective products or professional
malpractice, and plaintiffs with injuries that are similar but unre-
lated to defective products or malpractice.6 9
Regardless of whether plaintiffs base these challenges on state
or federal equal protection grounds, state courts usually follow the
United States Supreme Court's equal protection standards of re-
view. 70 Most recent opinions have applied the "rational basis" test
after finding that statutes of repose do not implicate "fundamental
rights" or "suspect classes. "71 Under the rational basis standard,
courts uphold legislation if the statutory classification is reasona-
bly related to a legitimate legislative objective.7 2 Courts have had
S.E.2d 484 (1983).
67. See, e.g., Pitts v. Unarco Indus., 712 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1983); Scalf v. Berkel,
Ind. App. -, 448 N.E.2d 1201 (1983); Davis v. Whiting Corp., 66 Or. App. 541, 674 P.2d
1194 (1984).
68. See, e.g., Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 730 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1984); Austin v.
Litvak, - Colo. - , 682 P.2d 41 (1984); Allrid v. Emory Univ., 249 Ga. 35, 285 S.E.2d
521 (1982).
69. See, e.g., Shessel v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56, 316 S.E.2d 155 (1984); Heath v. Sears,
Roebuck, Inc., - N.H. -, 464 A.2d 288 (1983); Armijo v. Tandyish, 98 N.M. 181, 646
P.2d 1245 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).
70. See McGovern, supra note 3, at 607. But see infra text accompanying notes 170-
73 (discussing cases in which state courts have refused to follow federal guidelines).
71. See, e.g., Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1984); Wayne v. Ten-
nessee Valley Auth., 730 F.2d 392, 404 (5th Cir. 1984); Davis v. Whiting Corp., 66 Or. App.
541, 543, 674 P.2d 1194, 1196 (1984); see also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 17 (1972) (asserting that if the legislation does not affect a suspect class or
fundamental right, the appropriate standard of review is a rational basis test); McGovern,
supra note 3, at 607. If a "fundamental right" or "suspect class" is concerned, then the
appropriate standard of review is strict scrutiny. See infra text accompanying note 106.
72. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17 (The court must determine whether the legis-
lation "rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose."); Schwan v. Riverside
Methodist Hosp., 6 Ohio St. 3d 300, 301, 452 N.E.2d 1337, 1338 (1983) ("[A] classification is
valid if it 'rationally further[s] a legitimate legislative objective.' "). Unfortunately for ana-
lytical purposes, courts have been inconsistent in their formulations of the "rational basis"
or "reasonable relation" test. Some courts state that the rational basis test requires that the
statutory classification have a "fair and substantial" relation to the object of the legislation.
See, e.g., Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470, 472, 298 S.E.2d 484, 486 (1983) (citing Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)); Banhouse v. City of Pinole, 133 Cal. App. 3d 171, 182, 18 Cal. Rptr.
881, 887 (1982). The New Hampshire Supreme Court uses the same "fair and substantial"
language to describe a higher level of scrutiny. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925,
933, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (1980). The key element seems to be the label "rational basis," rather
than the description of what the test requires. Courts that use the "fair and substantial
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little difficulty concluding that a statute of repose serves legitimate
legislative objectives.73 Perhaps the most frequently cited legisla-
tive purpose is the desire to prevent the assertion of stale claims. 74
Another well-established objective is the interest in protecting de-
fendants from uncertain and protracted liability, particularly in
light of the erosion of common-law tort defenses. 5 Many courts
also note the need to stabilize defendants' insurance rates and,
consequently, to keep consumer prices down.76
The next step in the rational basis analysis requires that the
court find a reasonable basis for the statute's classification. 77 Most
courts find a reasonable basis for the defendant- or plaintiff-based
classifications that statutes of repose establish .7  The grounds of
classification courts most frequently cite as acceptable fall into the
following general categories: 79 (1) feasibility of quality control;80 (2)
alternative applicable theories of liability and defenses;8" (3) num-
ber of potential plaintiffs;8 2 (4) the defendant's continuing involve-
relation" language to describe the rational basis test do not apply any stricter scrutiny than
is applied under the traditional formulation of the rational basis test.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 36-47 for a discussion of the legislative objec-
tives of statutes of repose.
74. See, e.g., Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1982); Yarbro v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., - Colo. _ 655 P.2d 822 (1983); Beecher v. White, - Ind. App.
447 N.E.2d 622 (1983).
75. See, e.g., Barnhouse v. City of Pinole, 133 Cal. App. 3d 171, 183 Cal. Rptr. 881
(1982); Yarbro, - Colo. -, 655 P.2d 822; Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 437 N.E.2d
514 (1972).
76. See, e.g., Mathis v. Eli Lilly & Co., 719 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1983); Davis v. Whiting
Corp., 66 Or. App. 541, 674 P.2d 1194 (1984).
77. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, Dykes, Goodenberger, Bower & Clancy,
740 F.2d 1362, 1371 (6th Cir. 1984).
78. For a discussion of the distinctions typically created by statutes of repose, see
supra text accompanying notes 14-35.
79. See McGovern, supra note 3, at 609.
80. For example, a supplier of materials for a construction job can maintain high
quality control standards in the controlled environment of the factory, while an architect's
design can be tested and controlled only to a limited extent before actual use. See, e.g.,
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 740 F.2d at 1372; Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2, 366 So.
2d 1381, 1386 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
81. For instance, an owner of a building is only liable in tort and only for events
occurring while he is in possession of the premises, but a builder may be liable under various
legal theories, including contract and tort liability. See, e.g., Cheswold Volunteer Fire Co. v.
Lambertson Constr. Co., 462 A.2d 416, 426 n.15 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982); Freezer Storage, Inc.
v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978).
82. The owner of a building, for example, may be liable only to persons who come
onto the premises while he is in possession and, in many jurisdictions, to a lesser degree if
the persons who enter are not invitees. A builder, on the other hand, may be liable to own-
ers, tenants, and any others who may use the premises at any time. See Barnhouse v. City of
Pinole, 133 Cal. App. 3d 171, 182, 183 Cal. Rptr. 881, 887 (1982).
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ment with the product, building, or patient; 3 and (5) insurance
coverage and costs.84 Some courts are not persuaded that these
reasons justify classifying groups of potential defendants or plain-
tiffs."5 For example, one court has maintained that if there is a
structural defect in a building, all who participated in the con-
struction should be held accountable, rather than allowing the tim-
ing of the defect's manifestation to determine who will be held
liable.8 6
The third and final step in the rational basis test is to find a
reasonable relationship between the classification and the legisla-
tive purpose.8 7 Generally, courts that have found both a reasonable
basis for the classification and a legitimate state purpose also have
found a rational relation between the two. 8 For example, if pro-
tecting defendants from protracted liability is a permissible goal,
the legislature may conclude that a reasonable point at which to
cut off claims is ten years after substantial completion." Con-
83. For example, the owner or person in possession of a building can maintain ade-
quate safety conditions and is in control at the time of any incidents giving rise to litigation,
whereas the architect has no control over the condition of the building after construction
has been completed. See Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., - Colo. -, 655 P.2d 822
(1983).
84. The owner of a building, for instance, is more likely to have insurance coverage
available at reasonable rates for accidents in the building, than the contractor, who would
have to pay exorbitant rates to cover the potential liability from the numerous buildings he
constructs. See Barnhouse, 133 Cal. App. 3d at 182, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (1982).
85. See cases cited infra notes 90-91.
86. See Henderson Clay Prods., Inc. v. Edgar Wood & Assocs., Inc., 122 N.H. 800,
-, 451 A.2d 174, 175 (1982). Other courts consider it unreasonable to hold an owner
liable for an injury that resulted from an architect's negligence. See, e.g., State Farm Fire &
Casualty v. All Elec., Inc., 99 Nev. 222, 228-29, 660 P.2d 995, 999 (1983); Skinner v. Ander-
son, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 460, 231 N.E.2d 588, 590-91 (1967).
87. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, Dykes, Goodenberger, Bower & Clancy,
740 F.2d 1362, 1368-69 (6th Cir. 1984).
88. See, e.g., Van Den Hul v. Baltic Farmers Elevator Co., 716 F.2d 504, 511 (8th Cir.
1983) ("ITIhe six-year period is rationally related to the legislature's legitimate objective of
barring stale claims. . . ."); Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., - Colo. -, - 655 P.2d
822, 827 (1983) ("[T]he statute bears a reasonable relationship to the legislative objective of
limiting liability for architects, contractors, engineers, and inspectors whose work ... gener-
ally ends at the time of substantial completion of a project."); Allrid v. Emory Univ., 249
Ga. 35, , 285 S.E.2d 521, 525 (1982) (finding the exception for medical malpractice cases
involving foreign objects left in the body to be reasonably related to the legitimate purpose
of avoiding stale or frivolous claims).
89. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 740 F.2d at 1368-69. To support this argument, the Hart-
ford court noted studies that have shown that 99% of claims brought against architects are
brought within 10 years. See id. Interestingly, similar statistics can be cited for the opposite
proposition-there is no significant "long-tail" problem, and thus a statute of repose may
not be a justifiable means of protecting defendants. See Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69,
-, 688 P.2d 961, 978 (1984) (en banc).
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versely, courts that find no rational basis for the statutory classifi-
cation also tend to find no reasonable relation to the legislative
objective.90 One court, for example, held that the special treatment
of minors under age ten in a medical malpractice statute of repose
was an unreasonable distinction, unrelated to the purpose of allevi-
ating the malpractice "crisis." 91
Thus, the majority of courts applying the rational basis test to
an equal protection challenge have upheld the statutes of repose.92
Some recent courts have relied on this weight of authority alone as
evidence that statutes of repose must have a reasonable basis.9 8 An
Indiana court recently noted that the debate among the states in
itself indicated that reasonable men differ and that, therefore, stat-
utes of repose are not manifestly unreasonable. 4 Some courts,
however, are unwilling to accept the reasoning of previous cases
90. See, e.g., Austin v. Litvak, - Colo. _ _ 682 P.2d 41, 50 (1984) (en banc)
(finding the exceptions for "foreign objects" and "knowing concealment" in a medical mal-
practice statute of repose to be "without reasonable basis in fact" and unrelated to the
purpose of avoiding stale and frivolous claims); Shessel v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56, _ 316
S.E.2d 155, 158 (1984) (finding the "three-way classification" between plaintiffs with medi-
cal malpractice claims who are injured before and those injured after the statutory period
expires and plaintiffs with no medical malpractice claims not reasonably related to the ob-
jective of avoiding stale claims); Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470, 472, 298 S.E.2d 484, 486 (1983)
(finding "no rational basis for a limitation scheme which permits a medical malpractice
wrongful death action if the patient dies within two years of the defendant's negligent act
but which bars a wrongful death action if the patient lives for two years after defendant's
negligent act where the defendant is a doctor but not in other wrongful death cases." The
court also found this classification unrelated to the purpose of avoiding stale claims because
"a claim which has not arisen.., is not stale."); Shibuya v. Architects Hawaii Ltd., 65
Hawaii 26, 43, 647 P.2d 276, 288 (1982) (finding the distinctive treatment of the construc-
tion industry not reasonably related to the objective of avoiding stale claims); State Farm
Fire & Casualty v. All Elec., Inc., 99 Nev. 222, 228, 660 P.2d 995, 1000 (1983) (finding the
distinction between architects, owners, and materialmen unreasonable and unrelated to the
concerns of defendants' difficulties in defending suits).
91. See Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 6 Ohio St. 3d 300, 452 N.E.2d 1337
(1983). One commentator has noted that the typical rationale for infant tolling provisions is
that minors are "disabled" and should be protected from losing their causes of action. Mi-
nors should not be penalized if their parents fail to bring suit. See Comment, Infant Tolling
Statutes in Medical Malpractice Cases, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 469 (1984). The Ohio court's argu-
ment remains valid, however, because the court asserted that 10 years of age is an irrational
cut off point, not that there is no rational basis for an infant tolling provision.
92. In 33 cases since 1981, only six decisions have held statutes of repose invalid
under a rational basis equal protection analysis. See Appendix; see also Lamb v. Wedge-
wood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, _ , 302 S.E.2d 868, 878-79 (1983) ("[T]he overwhelming
majority of the most recent cases ... which considered the constitutional equal protection
challenge to statutes [of repose] have sustained the statutes.").
93. See, e.g., Beecher v. White, - Ind. App. , 447 N.E.2d 622 (1983).
94. See id..
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and find no rational basis to uphold statutes of repose.95
At least one state has applied a "mid-tier" or "heightened
scrutiny" analysis to an equal protection challenge to a statute of
repose. In the leading case of Carson v Maurer, the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court found that "[a]lthough the right to recover
for personal injuries is not a 'fundamental right', . . . [it is] suffi-
ciently important to require that the restrictions imposed on [it]
be subjected to a more rigorous judicial scrutiny than allowed
under the rational basis test."9 The court's test requires that the
challenged classification be reasonable and have a "fair and sub-
stantial relation to the object of the legislation."98 In Carson, the
court found a medical malpractice statute unreasonable because it
made an exception for cases involving foreign objects left in the
body.99 New Hampshire has not limited its "mid-tier" analysis to
medical malpractice cases. In Henderson Clay Products, Inc. v.
Edgar Wood and Associates the court held it unreasonable for a
construction statute of repose to provide one rule for actions
against architects and a different rule for actions against material-
men and laborers. 100 In Heath v. Sears, Roebuck the New Hamp-
shire court found a products liability statute of repose unreasona-
ble because it barred claims for injuries caused by defective
products but allowed claims for similar injuries unrelated to defec-
tive products.10 1
The heightened scrutiny analysis seems to have determined
the outcome of these New Hampshire cases. Adopting the mid-tier
analysis gave the court license to scrutinize more carefully the rela-
tionship between the statute and its purpose. For example, in
Heath the court noted that one purpose of the products liability
statute of repose was to ameliorate the products liability "insur-
95. See cases cited supra notes 90-91.
96. New Hampshire is apparently the only state to have adopted expressly a mid-tier
analysis for statutes of repose. See McGovern, supra note 3, at 608. Although other courts
have used the same "fair and substantial" language, they actually have applied a rational
basis test. See supra note 72. For a discussion of the reason why the New Hampshire court
felt free to diverge from federal court guidelines in adopting this standard, see infra text
accompanying note 171.
97. 120 N.H. 925, 931-32, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (1980).
98. Id. at 932-33, 424 A.2d at 831.
99. Id. at 936, 424 A.2d at 833.
100. 122 N.H. 800, 451 A.2d 174 (1982) (The statute provided for a six year period of
repose. For actions against architects, the period began to run on completion of perform-
ance, but for actions against materialmen and laborers, the period began to run upon discov-
ery of the cause of action.). See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508:4-b (1983).
101. 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288 (1983).
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ance crises. 1 0 2 The court then discussed studies that indicated
that the "crisis" had abated nationwide, independent of the New
Hampshire legislation. Thus, because the New Hampshire statute
had little or no effect on the national insurance situation, the stat-
ute had become divorced from its purpose. 03 If the court had ap-
plied a rational basis test, the court would have been more defer-
ential to the legislature and probably would have upheld that
statute.104
The third and final standard applied in equal protection cases
is the "strict scrutiny" analysis, which requires that the statutory
classification be "necessary" to serve a "compelling state inter-
est. 10 5 To invoke the strict scrutiny analysis, a statute must affect
a "fundamental right" or a "suspect class."' 06 In 1984, the Arizona
Supreme Court in Kenyon v. Hammer applied the strict scrutiny
test to a medical malpractice statute of repose.107 The Arizona
court noted that "fundamental rights" are rights "explicitly or im-
plicitly guaranteed by the constitution,"'108 and that because the
Arizona Constitution clearly guaranteed the right to bring a cause
of action,109 the statute affected a "fundamental right"'110 and war-
102. Id. at , 464 A.2d at 293-94.
103. Id. at , 464 A.2d at 296.
104. Courts applying the rational basis test are generally reluctant to consider the
facts available to the legislature if some rational basis for the legislature's decision exists.
These courts usually find that, when enacting the legislation, the legislature reasonably
could have concluded that a statute of repose would help ease the insurance "crisis." See,
e.g., Scalf v. Berkel, - Ind. App. -_, - 448 N.E.2d 1201, 1204, 1206 (1983).
Davis v. Whiting Corp., 66 Or. App. 541, -, 674 P.2d 1194, 1196 (1984).
105. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1971).
106. See generally San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17
(1973).
107. See Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961 (1984) (en banc). While the
Arizona court is the only court to have applied strict scrutiny to statutes of repose, one
commentator has argued that strict scrutiny is appropriate in medical malpractice cases
because the statutes affect the fundamental human interests of protection of life and limb.
See Witherspoon, Constitutionality of the Texas Statute Limiting Liability for Medical
Malpractice, 10 TEX. TECH L. REv. 419, 462 (1979).
108. 142 Ariz. at _ 688 P.2d at 975 (quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973)).
109. The Arizona Constitution reads in pertinent part: "The right of action to recover
damages for injuries shall never be abrogated. . ." ARiz. CONST. art. 18, § 6. In an opinion
following Kenyon, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the Arizona medical malpractice
statute violated this constitutional provision. See Barrio v. San Manuel Div. Hosp. for
Magna Copper Co. (Ariz. Dec. 10, 1984) (available on LEXIS, State library, Ariz. file).
110. The Arizona court asserted that any statute that bars a cause of action before it
can be brought "abrogates rather than limits" the cause of action, and, therefore, offends
the Arizona Constitution. Thus the court distinguished statutes of repose from statutes of
limitations. 142 Ariz. at -, 688 P.2d at 967.
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ranted the high standards of strict scrutiny. Applying the strict
scrutiny test, the Arizona court found that the only "compelling
state interest" a statute of repose could serve would be to make
quality medical care available to the public at a reasonable cost.111
In determining whether this statute was "necessary" to reach that
objective, the court noted that malpractice insurance premiums
had not declined and health care costs actually had increased since
the legislature enacted the statute. The court also found little evi-
dence that health care cost increases were attributable to malprac-
tice premiums. 11 2 The court concluded that a statute of repose was
not necessary to achieve the state's interest and, therefore, the
statute violated the state constitution's equal protection clause.
113
Kenyon provides another example of a court that engaged in close
scrutiny of legislative action and found that the insurance crisis
rationale was unfounded.
B. Due Process
Plaintiffs often challenge statutes of repose on the ground that
denying or encroaching upon an individual's right to sue violates
due process guarantees. 4 As in equal protection cases, many state
courts rely on United States Supreme Court guidelines in due pro-
cess cases, regardless of whether the state courts are applying state
or federal constitutional provisions. 115 The majority of recent due
process cases has followed historical practice and applied a "ra-
tional basis" test to statutes of repose."" Many courts that have
adopted this standard rely on Supreme Court dicta from Silver v.
111. Id. at-_, 688 P.2d at 976. The court rejected the argument that the limitation
of actions was necessary to protect health care providers from the economic hardship caused
by high insurance premiums. The court found that the state has "neither a compelling nor
legitimate interest in providing economic relief to one segment of society by depriving those
who have been wronged of access to. . .the judicial system." Id. at -, 688 P.2d at 976.
112. Id. at -, 688 P.2d at 977.
113. Id. at -, 688 P.2d at 977-79.
114. McGovern, supra note 3, at 613. For more recent cases concerning due process
challenges see Appendix. The due process clause provides: "... nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
115. McGovern, supra note 3, at 613.
116. Id. Some courts do not rule expressly on the appropriate standard of review in
statutes of repose cases, but proceed to apply the rational basis test. See, e.g., Jewson v.
Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1982); Armijo v. Tandyish, 98 N.M. 181, 646 P.2d 1245
(N.M. Ct. App. 1981). Among cases decided since 1981, 18 of 24 applied a rational basis test
to a due process claim. For a discussion of cases applying different tests, see infra notes 125-
31 and accompanying text.
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Silver:11 7 "[Tihe Constitution does not forbid ... the abolition of
old [rights] recognized by the common law, to attain a permissible
legislative objective."" 8 Courts also find support in Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Groups, Inc., in which the
Supreme Court ruled that liability limitations with an economic
purpose are constitutional unless the legislature acted in an arbi-
tary and irrational way.1 9 Under the rational basis test, therefore,
courts will uphold a statute if it is rationally related to a permissi-
ble objective 20 or if it is not arbitary and irrational.'2  Courts find
the "permissible legislative objectives" found in equal protection
analysis 22 also permissible in due process cases. Statutes generally
pass this highly deferential rational basis standard.' 2 ' No court has
invalidated a statute of repose solely on the basis of this "rational
basis" due process analysis. 24
A second line of cases asserts that due process protects only
vested rights and that the legislature is free to abrogate nonvested
rights.12' These courts reason that statutes of repose do not pre-
vent a plaintiff from bringing a cause of action; rather, they pre-
vent a cause of action from ever arising. Thus, the plaintiff's al-
leged right to a common-law cause of action is a nonvested right. 12
Consequently, the abrogation of that nonvested right does not
117. 280 U.S. 117 (1929). Several recent cases have relied on Silver v. Silver. See, e.g.,
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, Dykes, Goodenberger, Bower & Clancy, 740 F.2d 1362,
1367 (6th Cir. 1984); Mathis v. Eli Lilly & Co., 719 F.2d 134, 138 (6th Cir. 1983); Klein v.
Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, -, 437 N.E.2d 514, 522 (1982); see also McGovern, supra note 3,
at 614.
118. 280 U.S. at 122.
119. 438 U.S. 59, 84-85 (1978); see Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 740 F.2d at 1368 (citing
Duke Power).
120. See, e.g., Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, - , 437 N.E.2d 514, 519 (1982);
Thornton v. Mono Mfg., 99 Ill. App. 3d 722, 725, 425 N.E.2d 522, 524 (1981).
121. Some courts apply an "arbitrary and irrational" standard instead of the "permis-
sible legislative objectives" standard found in Silver. See, e.g., Wayne v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 730 F.2d 392, 403 (5th Cir. 1984); Mathis v. Eli Lilly & Co., 719 F.2d 134, 138 (6th
Cir. 1983).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76.
123. See McGovern, supra note 3, at 613.
124. See id. Although some courts recently have found that statutes of repose violate
due process, see Appendix, no court applying the deferential rational basis test has invali-
dated a statute solely on due process grounds.
125. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. All Elec., Inc., - Nev. -, 660
P.2d 995 (1983); Sowders v. M.W. Kellogg, 663 S.W.2d 644, 648 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); see
also McGovern, supra note 3, at 613.
126. See, e.g., Mathis v. Eli Lilly & Co., 719 F.2d 134, 138 (6th Cir. 1983) (quoting
Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 88 n.32); Sowders, 663 S.W.2d at 648. But cf. Daugaard v. Baltic
Coop. Bldg. Supply Ass'n, 349 N.W.2d 419, 427 (S.D. 1984) (finding under an open courts
analysis that appellants had a vested right in a common-law negligence cause of action).
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deny the plaintiff his due process rights.
A third line of decisions maintains that due process only re-
quires a statute of repose to allow a reasonable time to sue. 127
These courts, however, disagree on whether a statute of repose, by
its nature, can allow a reasonable period. Some courts find the
statutes valid on the ground that the statutory period does allow a
reasonable time to sue. 128 This result is especially frequent in cases
concerning statutes that allow persons injured near the end of the
statutory period an extra grace period within which to bring suit. 29
Other courts find that a statute of repose potentially allows no
time to sue because it bars the cause of action before it accrues.130
Under this rationale, statutes of repose clearly violate due process
requirements."'1
C. Open Courts, Access to Courts, and Remedy
A notable provision found in most state constitutions is the
"open courts,". "access to courts," or "remedy" clause. 13 2 These
provisions guarantee that courts of justice will be open to every
person for the redress of injury without denial or delay.13 3 Open
courts provisions are not worded identically in every state consti-
127. See, e.g., Calder v. City of Crystal, 318 N.W.2d 838, 844 (Minn. 1982); Terry v.
New Mexico Highway Comm'n, 98 N.M. 119, 645 P.2d 1375 (1982).
128. See, e.g., Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 730 F.2d 392, 404 (5th Cir. 1983);
Davis v. Whiting Corp., 66 Or. App. 541, -, 674 P.2d 1194, 1196 (1984).
129. See, e.g., CALIF. CIv. PROC. CODE § 337.1(b) (West 1982); OI. REV. STAT. §
30.905(2) (1983).
130. See, e.g., Terry v. New Mexico State Highway Comm'n, 98 N.M. 119, _ 645
P.2d 1375, 1378 (1982); O'Connor v. Altus, 67 N.J. 106, 117, 335 A.2d 545, 553 (1975).
131. See Terry, 98 N.M. at 119, 645 P.2d at 1375 (finding that the statute of repose
violated due process because it did not allow a grace period for plaintiffs injured near the
end of the statutory period).
132. This provision is by no means the only state constitutional provision asserted
against statutes of repose. Of course, state due process and equal protection clauses often
are asserted. Another frequently raised provision is the prohibition against special legisla-
tion. See, e.g., COLO. CONsT. art. V, § 25 ("The general assembly shall not pass... special
laws granting ... any special or exclusive privilege .... "). Special legislation challenges
generally are subsumed within an equal protection analysis. See generally McGovern, supra
note 3, at 610-12. Another provision sometimes applied to statutes of repose requires legisla-
tion to encompass only one subject. See, e.g., S.D. CONST. art. In, § 21. See generally Mc-
Govern, supra note 3, at 618. Litigants have raised other distinctive state constitutional
provisions, but these provisions are so many and varied as to render any generalizations
meaningless.
133. -See, e.g., N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 18 ("All courts shall be open; every person for an
injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of
law; and right and justice shall be administered without favor, denial or delay."). Thirty-
seven state constitutions have similar provisions. See McGovern, supra note 3, at 615 n.218.
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tution, and variations among the states can lead to different inter-
pretations and different results. 34 This section focuses on cases ad-
dressing similar provisions.
Relying on three principal arguments,13 5 most courts have
found that statutes of repose do not violate open courts provi-
sions.' First, these courts reason that the right to bring a cause of
action is not a vested right and that legislatures have the power to
abrogate a nonvested right. 3 7 Second, open courts provisions guar-
antee access to the courts only for "legal injuries," and plaintiffs
injured after the expiration of the statutory period have no legally
cognizable injuries.138 Third, these courts argue that open courts
provisions are mandates to the judiciary, not the legislatures. 39
These arguments140 are similar to the arguments relied on in a due
process analysis. Indeed, some courts refer to open courts provi-
sions as state due process clauses.' 4' Because of this similarity,
some courts go beyond relying solely on this reasoning and apply a
basic due process analysis to open courts challenges, looking for a
reasonable relation between the statute and a legitimate legislative
purpose. 14 These decisions, therefore, generally parallel due pro-
cess decisions.
The Kentucky Supreme Court recently enunciated another
basis for upholding a statute of repose under an open courts chal-
lenge. In a 1973 opinion, Saylor v. Hall, the Kentucky court held
that a construction statute of repose violated the state open courts
provision. 14 Subsequent Kentucky cases have clarified that ruling.
134. See infra text accompanying notes 179-82.
135. See McGovern, supra note 3, at 616.
136. See Appendix.
137. See, e.g., Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., - Colo. 655 P.2d 822, 827
(1982); Sowders v. M.W. Kellogg, 663 S.W.2d 644, 648 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
138. See, e.g., Van Den Hul v. Baltic Farmers Elevator Co., 716 F.2d 504, 512 (8th
Cir. 1983); Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 433, 302 So. 2d 868, 882 (1983).
139. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, Dykes, Goodenberger, Bower & Clancy,
740 F.2d 1362, 1369 (6th Cir. 1984). But see Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Ky. 1973).
140. Some courts limit the open court analysis to these three arguments. See, e.g.,
Lamb, 308 N.C. at , 302 S.E.2d at 880-83.
141. See, e.g., Scalf v. Berkel, - Ind. App. -, -, 448 N.E.2d 1201, 1205
(1983) (referring to the Alabama open courts decision, Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hag-
erty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982), as a state due process case); cf. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 740
F.2d 1362 (describing the Ohio open courts provisions as "equivalent to the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
142. See, e.g., Davis v. Whiting Corp., 66 Or. App. 541, 674 P.2d 1194 (1984); Klein v.
Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, -, 437 N.E.2d 514, 519 (1982).
143. 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973).
1985]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
In Carney v. Moody144 and Ball Homes, Inc. v. VolpertM5 the court
emphasized that the open courts provision protects causes of ac-
tion that existed not only when the challenged statute was enacted,
but also when the state constitution was adopted.1 4 6 Ball Homes
upheld a construction statute of repose because no cause of action
based on an implied warranty against a vendor existed when the
legislature enacted the statute.14 7 Carney upheld the same statute
because the law existing in 1891, the year the state constitution
was adopted, did not afford a remedy against negligent builders. 4 8
A growing number of courts has found that statutes of repose
violate open courts provisions. 4 9 These courts have followed vari-
ous approaches.150 One line of cases maintains that the open courts
provision prohibits the legislature from abolishing certain com-
mon-law rights without providing an alternative remedy, unless
there is an overriding public necessity. A leading Florida case' 5 '
enunciated this principal, and the Alabama Supreme Court re-
cently refined the principal into a two-tiered analysis.15 2 Under the
Alabama court's analysis, if the legislation abolishes or alters a
common-law cause of action, then the court applies a relatively
strict level of scrutiny. Courts will uphold such legislation only if it
provides a quid pro quo. The quid pro quo may be offered to the
individual in the form of equivalent benefits or protection. Alter-
nately, it may be offered to society in the form of eradicating a
perceived social evil. If the legislation does not affect a common-
law cause of action, the court will be highly deferential to the legis-
lature, upholding the statute unless it is arbitrary or capricious. 5 3
In Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty'" the Alabama Su-
preme Court found a products liability statute of repose invalid
under both tiers of analysis. Applying the stricter level of scrutiny,
the court identified consumer price and insurance premium infla-
144. 646 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1982).
145. 633 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. 1982).
146. 646 S.W.2d at 41.
147. 633 S.W.2d at 64.
148. 646 S.W.2d at 41.
149. See Appendix.
150. See generally McGovern, supra note 3, at 616-18.
151. See Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirraons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979).
152. See Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 1000 (Ala. 1982);
Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 394 So. 2d 334, 350-54 (Ala. 1980) (Shores, J.,
concurring).
153. Lankford, 416 So. 2d at 999-1000; Coleman, 394 So. 2d at 341-44 (Jones, J.,
concurring).
154. 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982).
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tion as the "social evil," but held that no "substantial relationship"
existed between a statute of repose limiting products liability
claims and lower consumer costs.155 Lankford is yet another exam-
ple of a court engaging in closer scrutiny of statutes of repose and
rejecting the insurance crisis rationale. Under the second tier of
analysis, the court found that the statute of repose was arbitrary in
two respects. First, it barred the claim of a person injured by a
defective product ten years and one month after first using the
product, while allowing the claim of a person injured by the same
product nine years and eleven months after first use. Second, the
statute did not provide for an extension of the limitation period for
a person injured just before the period expired. For these two rea-
sons the court found that the statute failed to pass even the highly
deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard.5 6 This second as-
pect of the Lankford ruling is significant because holding that a
statute of repose is arbitrary renders it invalid under the rational
basis test in either a due process or equal protection context.157
Another line of cases simply holds that an absolute denial of
access to courts before the claim even arises is antithetical to the
purpose of open courts provisions. 58 One court stated, "Death can-
not occur without there first being conception. . . .Neither can a
cause of action expire before it accrues."'159 These courts refute the
arguments that traditionally have been used to uphold statutes of
repose. 60 For example, the South Dakota Supreme Court recently
ruled that plaintiffs possess a vested right in a common-law negli-
gence cause of action and, therefore, a statute of repose, which
abolished that vested right, was unconstitutional.'' In another re-
cent decision162 concerning legislative power over common-law
causes of action, the Rhode Island Supreme Court distinguished
between the power to alter the substance of the common law and
the power to deny completely a plaintiff's day in court. The court
155. The court based its conclusion that no "substantial relationship" existed on find-
ings from task force reports and other commentaries. Id. at 1001-03.
156. Id. at 1003.
157. See supra notes 72, 121, and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g. Co., - R.I. - , 471 A.2d 195
(1984); Daugaard v. Baltic Corp. Bldg. Supply Ass'n, 349 N.W.2d 419 (S.D. 1984). Rigorous
dissents in these cases assert many of the same arguments traditionally used to uphold stat-
utes under open courts provisions. See, e.g., Kennedy, - R.I. at _, 471 A.2d at 201-06.
159. Daugaard, 349 N.W.2d at 425 (quoting McMacken v. State, 320 N.W.2d 131, 141
(S.D. 1982) (Henderson, J., dissenting)).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 137-39.
161. Daugaard, 349 N.W.2d at 427.
162. Kennedy, - R.I. -, 471 A.2d 195.
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maintained that the legislature clearly had the power to alter sub-
stantive rights but the open courts provision prohibits the legisla-
ture from completely denying those rights to any plaintiff.163
A fundamental concern underlying both due process and open
courts issues is the proper degree of deference to be given to legis-
latures.6 4 One group of courts has expressed the concern that in-
validating legislation, simply because that legislation rejects some
cause of action preferred by the courts, would encroach unduly
upon the legislature's role in developing the law. "Such a result
would offend our notions of checks and balances between the vari-
ous branches of government, and the flexibility required for the
healthy growth of the law."' 6 5 These courts are reluctant to inter-
pret due process or open courts provisions as imposing strict re-
straints on the legislature.166 Consequently, courts espousing this
view maintain a relatively high degree of deference to the legisla-
ture when reviewing statutes of repose. Conversely, another group
of courts acknowledges that while a great number of issues should
be left to the legislature's discretion, the courts have a duty to en-
sure that the legislature has not violated constitutional re-
straints.16 7 A number of courts imposes a stricter level of scrutiny
in these cases on the theory that statutes of repose affect constitu-
tionally protected rights.'6 8
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Effect of State Constitutional Law
State constitutional law has played a significant role in a num-
ber of recent rulings on statutes of repose. Although many courts
simply rely on federal constitutional guidelines when applying a
state constitutions' equal protection or due process clause, 6 9 some
163. Id. at - , 471 A.2d at 199.
164. McGovern, supra note 3, at 581.
165. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, Dykes, Goodenberger, Bower & Clancy, 740
F.2d 1362, 1369-70 (6th Cir. 1984) (quoting Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476
Pa. 270, 281, 382 A.2d 715, 721 (1978)).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19, 125, 137-39.
167. See, e.g., Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961 (1984) (finding that the
right action to recover for injuries had been "taken from its status as. . .subject to the will
of the legislature and embedded in the Constitution," id. at 974 (quoting Alabama's Freight
Co. v. Hunt, 29 Ariz. 419, 443-44, 242 P. 658, 665-66 (1926)); Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g.
Co., - R.I. -, -, 471 A.2d 195, 201 (1984).
168. See, e.g., Daugaard v. Baltic Coop. Bldg. Suppy Ass'n, 349 N.W.2d 419 (S.D.
1984).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 70, 115.
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state courts are beginning to break from this tradition. A leader in
this development is the New Hampshire Supreme Court. In Car-
son v. Maurer the court set a precedent by applying a heightened
scrutiny equal protection analysis to a statute of repose.1 0 The
court acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court had re-
stricted the heightened scrutiny test to cases concerning classifica-
tions based on gender or illegitimacy. Nevertheless, the court as-
serted, "[i]n interpreting our State Constitution . . .we are not
confined to federal constitutional standards and are free to grant
individuals more rights that [sic] the Federal Constitution re-
quires."'1 7 1 Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court in Kenyon v.
Hammer applied a strict scrutiny equal protection analysis to a
statute of repose. 172 The court based its holding solely on state
constitutional law, stating, "[Flederal authority is cited only for
the purpose of guidance and not because it compels the result
which we reach."'173 Thus, in the equal protection area, one effect
of state constitutional law has been to give state courts a license to
scrutinize legislative decisions more closely than the Supreme
Court has been willing to do at the federal level.
State constitutional provisions also can affect an equal protec-
tion analysis indirectly. For example, the Kenyon court adopted a
strict scrutiny standard because the statute of repose affected a
"fundamental right" protected by the state constitution. 174 The
statute of repose challenged in Kenyon offended an Arizona consti-
tutional provision that prohibited abrogation of the right of recov-
ery. It is less clear whether statutes of repose violate other state
constitutional provisions, such as open courts clauses. If state
courts endorse the United State Supreme Court's definition of
"fundamental right,' 75 however, they may consider the open
courts provision a constitutional guarantee of the right to bring a
cause of action. Furthermore, these courts may conclude that stat-
utes of repose affect this "fundamental right," a conclusion that
necessitates a strict scrutiny analysis. A state court's willingness to
apply a higher standard of review to a constitutional claim may
alter the outcome of a case. Thus, a state constitutional provision
could be the determinative factor in a federal constitutional
170. See supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
171. 120 N.H. 925, 932, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (1980).
172. See Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961 (1984).
173. 142 Ariz. at - , 688 P.2d at 963.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 106-10.
175. See supra text accompanying note 108.
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challenge.
The effect of state constitutional law is most readily apparent
in cases that address open courts challenges. Some courts maintain
that the open courts provision has no counterpart in the federal
constitution 17  and that state constitutions are free to provide
greater protections than are required under the federal constitu-
tion. 7 7 Thus, the open courts provision goes beyond basic due pro-
cess guarantees and demands a different standard of analysis.
Courts adhering to this interpretation of state constitutional law
apply a more rigorous test to statutes of repose than do other state
courts. For example, the Florida and Alabama courts have held
that the open courts provision prohibits a legislature from abolish-
ing a common-law right without providing an alternative cause of
action, unless there is a compelling necessity to do so. 178 Not all
state courts, however, interpret the open courts provision as impos-
ing such a stringent restraint on the legislature. An Indiana court
specifically rejected the Alabama court's approach and held that
an open courts provision does not create a "fundamental right."17 9
Courts that follow the Indiana court's rationale believe that show-
ing deference to the legislature is essential to the constitutional
scheme of separation of powers. 180 These courts generally apply a
rational basis type of analysis to statutes of repose., a' Other courts
refuse to put the label "open courts provision" on clauses in their
states' constitutions and thereby avoid following other states' open
courts analyses.1 82
In large part, the fact that the open courts question is a state
constitutional issue causes this diversity of opinion among state
courts. As the Florida court has stated, this open courts provision
176. See Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. 1979).
177. See Daugaard v. Baltic Coop. Bldg. Supply Ass'n, 349 N.W.2d 419, 425 (S.D.
1984).
178. See supra text preceding and accompanying notes 151-52.
179. See Scalf v. Berkel, Inc., - Ind. App. -, 448 N.E.2d 1201 (1983); cf. Thorn-
ton v. Mono Mfg., 99 IM. App. 3d 722, 727, 425 N.E.2d 522, 526 (1981) (asserting that the
remedy provision of the Illinois constitution "has not been given such a broad sweep as that
afforded by the Florida courts").
180. See supra text accompanying notes 165-66.
181. See supra text accompanying note 142.
182. Compare Nelms v. Georgian Manor Condominium Ass'n, 253 Ga. 410, 321 S.E.2d
330 (1984) (finding that the Georgia constitutional provision at issue should not be inter-
preted expansively to provide the same guarantees as the Alabama and Florida provisions)
with Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961 (1984) (finding the Arizona constitu-
tional provision at issue to provide greater protection than the typical open courts
provision).
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"derives its scope and meaning solely from Florida ... law. 1 83 In
interpreting state constitutional law, a court may consider other
states' rulings, but ultimately must base its decision on its own
laws and traditions, because they reflect that state's peculiar needs
and concerns. As a result, when state courts review open courts
challenges to statutes of repose, disparity in results is inevitable
and appropriate because the states should be free to interpret their
constitutional provisions as they see fit.
The assertion of state constitutional law over less restrictive
federal law on the issue of statutes of repose illustrates a general
resurgence of state constitutional law.184 This movement, which
commentators have labelled the "new federalism," reflects a grow-
ing willingness among state courts to apply state law when deter-
mining a question of individual rights. 85 New federalism is based
on the premise that the federal constitution establishes minimum,
rather than maximum, guarantees of individual rights.8 8 State
courts, therefore, should look to their own constitutions to deter-
mine the degree of protection that courts should afford individual
rights.187 Some commentators contend that renewed emphasis on
state constitutional law is a result of the Burger Court's retreat
from its predecessor's activist approach to individual liberties. 8
Indeed, the Burger Court has taken a "states' rights" stance and
has urged state courts to apply their own constitutional
doctrines. 89
Some state courts have incorporated this new federalism con-
cept into a systematic approach to questions concerning individual
rights. For example, the Oregon rule is that courts first must ana-
lyze state law, including state constitutional law, before reaching a
federal constitutional claim. 90 This "state law first" approach is
manifest in a number of recent rulings on statutes of repose' 91 and
183. Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. 1979).
184. See Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951 (1982); see gen-
erally Rebirth of Reliance on State Charters, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 12, 1984, at 25-32.
185. Abrahamson, supra note 184, at 952.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. Id. at 957-58.
189. See id. at 961.
190. See Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 614, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (1981); see also Linde,
First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. Rav. 379 (1980).
Other states have followed Oregon's lead in adopting a "state-law-first" approach. See, e.g.,
People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231, 578 P.2d 108, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1978); State v. Ball,
124 N.H. 226, 471 A.2d 347 (1983).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 171, 173, 177.
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is appropriate for constitutional issues. Consider, for example, due
process guarantees. One scholar has noted that the term "due"
suggests a dynamic concept192 and that each state's determination
of what is due process depends upon that state's own legal, histori-
cal, and social traditions. 19 The state court, therefore, is the
proper forum for determining the degree of protection to afford its
citizenry.
B. Future Direction
If a greater number of states adopt the new federalism ap-
proach, they probably will continue to disagree when ruling on the
constitutionality of statutes of repose. Arguably, a new federalism
approach would lead more courts to strike down these statutes be-
cause many courts that rely on state constitutional law apply rigor-
ous standards of review and occasionally review the entire circum-
stances surrounding the passage of the statutes."" In these cases
courts are beginning to question and reject some of the traditional
justifications for statutes of repose. For example, a number of
courts have found that statutes of repose actually do not help alle-
viate high insurance rates or high consumer prices.195 If more
courts begin to follow the lead of Alabama, Arizona, and New
Hampshire and reject traditional justifications for statutes of re-
pose, more state courts are likely to declare their statutes of repose
unconstitutional. Nonetheless, the ultimate result of renewed em-
phasis on state constitutional law undoubtedly would be continued
divergence among the states. The variety of state constitutional
provisions and the diversity of philosophies concerning the degree
of protection that should be afforded the right to bring a cause of
action inevitably will lead to different conclusions on the validity
of statutes of repose.
Whether additional states will place greater emphasis on state
constitutional law in future decisions remains to be seen. The ma-
jority of state courts may continue to rely on federal standards to
resolve constitutional issues because it is easier to operate within
well-established guidelines than to venture into uncharted areas.
Furthermore, state judges may not be willing to take the responsi-
bility for resolving the potentially volatile political issues of indi-
192. A. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNEYMEADM- MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTIUONA-
ISM IN AMERmCA 345 (1968).
193. Id.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 97, 102-04, 112, 155.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 103, 112, 155.
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vidual rights. 196 For these reasons, states may continue to follow
traditional approaches in analyzing statutes of repose. This scheme
is likely to lead to continued divergence, however, because state
courts disagree just as much when applying federal guidelines as
when they adopt state standards.
Another noticeable trend in recent cases is the tendency to
place heavy emphasis on prior rulings. The "analysis" in a great
number of recent cases construing statutes of repose has consisted
primarily of quotations and citations of authority supporting a
particular position. 197 This simplistic reliance on precedent per-
petuates the divergent findings of the leading cases of the 1970s.
Thus, continued disparity among the states over the issues of the
constitutionality of statutes of repose seems inevitable.
C. Arguments For and Against National Legislation
Given the disparity among state courts in their constitutional
analyses of statutes of repose, many commentators recommend im-
posing a uniform standard through national legislation. 198 Propo-
nents of a federal statute view professional malpractice and prod-
ucts liability as national issues. Insurance rates are set on a
nationwide basis.' 9 In the products liability area, many manufac-
turers market their products on a regional or national scale and
often base their marketing decisions on national data.200 The diver-
sity among state liability laws, therefore, is a burden on interstate
commerce.21' Advocates of a federal statute argue that federal leg-
islation would promote consistency, which would at least provide a
more accurate basis for insurance rates, if not actually reduce pre-
miums.2 0 2 Moreover, uniform products liability laws would facili-
tate the flow of interstate commerce and allow manufacturers to
196. See Abrahamnson, supra note 184, at 962. This notion may be especially true of
publicly elected state court judges who do not enjoy the immunization from popular pres-
sure and sentiment that accompanies lifetime tenure. Id.
197. See, e.g., Twin Falls Clinic & Hasp. Bldg. Corp. v. Hammill, 103 Idaho 19, 644
P.2d 341 (1982).
198. See, e.g., Schwartz & Means, The Need For Federal Product Liability and Toxic
Tort Legislation: A Current Assessment, 28 VmL. L. Rav. 1088 (1983); Twerski, National
Product Liability Legislation: In Search for the Best of All Possible Worlds, 18 IDAHO L.
REv. 411 (1982).
199. Schwartz & Means, supra note 198, at 1091-92.
200. Dworkin, supra note 59, at 616.
201. Schwartz & Bares, Federal Reform of Product Liability Law: A Solution That
Will Work, 13 CAP. UL. REv. 351, 358 (1984).
202. Dworkin, supra note 59, at 618 (citing Schwartz, 9 PROD. SAFry & LIAB. REP.
(BNA) 951 (Dec. 18, 1981)).
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base marketing decisions on economic principles rather than indi-
vidual state liability laws.20 s Consumers would benefit from lower
insurance rates and increased efficiency. Finally, a federal statute
would be much less vulnerable to constitutional attack,204 thereby
enhancing the prospects of uniformity.
Not everyone agrees that national legislation is appropriate.
One argument against a uniform act is based on the centuries-old
tradition that tort law belongs to the states. This argument reflects
the fundamental federalist concepts underpinning our judicial sys-
tem. According to one commentator, "[t]he strength of our legal
system has through trial and error evolved bodies of law. . . which
meet the particular social and economic needs of each of the states.
As states we are different, and our specific requirements have been
developed and decided where they are best understood. '20 5 One of
the great advantages of our federal system is this practice of exper-
imentation among the states.206 Each state can serve as a labora-
tory of sorts, experimenting with various social and economic poli-
cies without having to gain a national consensus and without
threatening any other state's interests. 20 7 This system allows for
flexibility and growth, which could be impaired if Congress enacted
national legislation.2 08 For these reasons, as one court has stated,
"[Tihe state's interest in fashioning its own rules of tort law is par-
203. See generally Reed & Watkins, Product Liability Tort Reform: The Case for
Federal Action, 63 NE. L. REv. 387, 438-43 (1984) (discussing the effect of diverse laws on
product development and marketing).
204. Federal legislation is less likely to fall under constitutional attack for two rea-
sons. First, the supremacy clause of the federal constitution effectively precludes state con-
stitutional law challenges. As long as the federal legislation does not offend the federal con-
stitution, the legislation will supersede state law. Smith, supra note 2, at - Second, a
federal statute of repose is most likely to be considered a valid exercise of Congress' com-
merce clause powers. Reed & Watkins, supra note 203, at 468. Furthermore, federal consti-
tutional guidelines suggest that federal courts would apply lenient rationality tests to stat-
utes of repose, see supra text accompanying notes 118-19 and text following note 170,
thereby making these statutes more likely to withstand constitutional attack.
205. Comment, Nationalizing Torts, 68 A.BA J. 772 (1982) (quoting Ernest Y.
Sevier).
206. Newman, The 'Old Federalism': Protection of Individual Rights by State Con-
stitutions in an Era of Federal Court Passivity, 15 CONN. L. Rav. 21, 23 (1982).
207. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
208. Dworkin, supra note 59, at 642 n.235 (quoting National Legal Center for the
Public Interest, Pre-Conference Working Paper for the Fifth Nat'l Conference on Product
Liability Law & Tort Reform of John W. Wade, An Overview of Differing Perspectives on
Tort Law Reform, 2-3 (Apr. 1982)).
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amount to any discernable federal interest ....
Critics of national legislation also point out that a federal stat-
ute may not achieve its avowed purpose of uniformity. Any statute
is subject to judicial interpretation and thus may take on different
meanings in different contexts. Varying judicial interpretations
and choice of law problems could create more uncertainty than
currently exists. 210 Finally, critics argue that a statute of repose is
not necessary to reduce insurance rates.2 n One of the primary jus-
tifications for adopting a federal statute of repose, therefore, is fa-
tally flawed.
V. CONCLUSION
The dispute over whether to adopt a federal statute of repose
can best be resolved by considering the fundamental interests at
issue. One interest is based on economic concerns. Proponents of
statutes of repose primarily seek to promote the economic interests
of certain industries and the economy in general by limiting the
time period within which plaintiffs can sue.212 Opponents of stat-
utes of repose respond to this economic justification with two argu-
ments. First, critics simply contend that as a practical matter stat-
utes of repose do not achieve these economic goals. 218 Second,
critics argue that it is an inappropriate social policy to give greater
weight to defendants' economic interest in avoiding liability than
to plaintiffs' economic interest in recovering damages. 21 4
Economic concerns, however, constitute only one of the funda-
mental interests at issue in the dispute over whether to enact a
national statute of repose. Statutes of repose also limit a plaintiff's
right to redress a grievance through our judicial system. This right
is essential to any democratic form of government. Our constitu-
tional history illustrates that an opportunity to be heard is "such a
fundamental expectation that no court has paused to wonder seri-
ously whether it is a good idea or not."21 5 Correlative to the inter-
209. Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, -, 688 P.2d 961, 971 (1984).
210. Comment, supra note 205. But see Reed & Watkins, supra note 203, at 470-71
(arguing that clear drafting and potential state court deference to federal courts' interpreta-
tions could eliminate uncertainties).
211. Studies have shown that the insurance problem was not the "crisis" that it was
portrayed to be. Insurance rates have now stabilized and the problem largely has been
solved. See Dworkin, supra note 59, at 618-19; Page & Stephens, supra note 57, at 396-97.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 2, 39-43.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 54-59, 210-11.
214. See supra text accompanying note 53.
215. A. HOwARD, supra note 192, at 346.
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est in giving plaintiffs their "day in court" is the interest in hold-
ing wrongdoers responsible for their actions, 18 which is clearly one
of the primary functions of our legal system. Statutes of repose
potentially bar suits before an injury occurs and, therefore, clearly
abrogate both the interest in redressing grievances and holding
tortfeasors liable for their actions.
When statutes of repose are properly viewed as implicating
these fundamental rights, in addition to economic concerns, the
dispute takes on an entirely different light. In this light the argu-
ments favoring a national response pale in comparison to the inter-
est in leaving the issue to the states. Tort law always has been a
matter of state law and this system has worked quite well.217 When
no consensus exists on whose economic interests the legislature
should serve, or to what degree or through what means those inter-
ests should be served, it is best to leave the unresolved questions
to the states. Each state can experiment with ways to achieve the
proper balance of the competing concerns and can determine what
is most expedient for its own jurisdiction. Furthermore, state
courts have a compelling interest in determining the extent to
which their citizens' individual rights are protected.2 1 8 This inter-
est may be even stronger in the 1980s because of the federal courts'
passive approach to individual liberties.21 9 Therefore, because the
value andimport of a federal statute of repose are highly debata-
ble, and the benefits of allowing the states to resolve these issues
are manifest, a federal statute hardly seems justifiable.
This Note's examination of the constitutionality of statutes of
repose has revealed a great disparity among the states and every
indication of continued disparity. This disparity is highly appro-
priate, for it reflects the continuing vitality of one of the essential
attributes of the American legal system. It is indeed refreshing to
learn that federalism reigns.
JOSEPHINE HERRING HIcKs
216. See supra text accompanying note 53.
217. See supra text preceeding and accompanying notes 205-09.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 186-93.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 184, 188-89.
[Vol. 38:627
STATUTES OF REPOSE
APPENDIX
The primary purpose of this Appendix is to list the most re-
cent cases on each type of statute, but the list also includes some
of the older cases that still represent prevailing law. For a list of
other pre-1981 cases, see McGovern, supra note 3, at 622-24.
Alabama
Jackson v. Mannesman Demag Corp., 435 So. 2d 725 (Ala.
1983) (holding construction statute violates state open courts pro-
vision); Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 966 (Ala.
1982) (holding products liability statute violates state open courts
provision). But see Tucker v. Nichols, 431 So. 2d 1263 (Ala. 1983)
(holding medical malpractice statute does not violate state open
courts provision because, unlike the statute in Lankford, it has a
"savings clause"); Bowlin Horn v. Citizen's Hosp., 425 So. 2d 1065
(Ala. 1983) (holding medical malpractice statute does not violate
equal protection).
Arizona
Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961 (1984) (holding
medical malpractice statute violates state equal protection
provision).
Arkansas
Owen v. Wilson, 260 Ark. 21, 537 S.W.2d 543 (1976) (holding
medical malpractice statute does not violate federal due process
provision); Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918
(1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 901 (1971) (holding construc-
tion statute does not violate federal due process or equal protec-
tion provisions).
California
Barnhouse v. City of Pinole, 133 Cal. App. 3d 171, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 881 (1982) (holding construction statute does not violate
equal protection or due process).
Colorado
Austin v. Litvak, - Colo. -, 682 P.2d 41 (1984) (holding
medical malpractice statute violates equal protection). But see
Criswell v. M. J. Brock & Sons, Inc., - Colo. , 681 P.2d 495
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(1984) (holding construction statute does not violate equal protec-
tion); Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., - Colo. -, 655 P.2d 822
(1983) (holding construction statute does not violate due process,
equal protection, or state open courts provisions).
Delaware
Cheswold Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lambertson Constr. Co.,
A.2d , 53 U.S.L.W. 2296 (Del. 1984) (holding construc-
tion statute does not violate federal due process or equal protec-
tion provisions); Dunn v. St. Francis Hosp., 401 A.2d 77 (Del.
1979) (holding medical malpractice statute does not violate state
open courts provision).
Florida
Cates v. Graham, 427 So. 2d 290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding medical malpractice statute is constitutional in case in
which plaintiff discovered injury before the statutory period
lapsed). But see Perez v. Univ. Eng'g Corp., 413 So. 2d 75 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding construction statute is unconstitu-
tional in case in which plaintiff's injury occurred after statutory
period lapsed); Diamond v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 397 So. 2d
671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding products liability statute
violates state open courts provision).
Georgia
Shessel v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56, 316 S.E.2d 155 (1984) (holding
medical malpractice statute violates equal protection). But see Al-
lrid v. Emory Univ., 249 Ga. 35, 285 S.E.2d 521 (1982) (holding
medical malpractice statute's exception for cases involving foreign
objects left in body does not violate equal protection or due
process).
Hawaii
Shibuya v. Architects Hawaii, Ltd., 65 Hawaii 26, 647 P.2d 276
(1982) (holding amended version of construction statute violates
equal protection).
Idaho
Holmes v. Iwasa, 104 Idaho 179, 657 P.2d 476 (1983) (holding
medical malpractice statute does not violate equal protection or
due process); Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp. Bldg. Corp. v. Hammill,
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103 Idaho 19, 644 P.2d 341 (1982) (holding construction statute
does not violate federal equal protection or state open courts
provisions).
Illinois
Matayka v. Melia, 119 Ill. App. 3d 221, 456 N.E.2d 353 (1983)
(holding amended version of construction statute, which had been
declared unconstitutional in Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455,
231 N.E.2d 588 (1967), does not violate state "special legislation"
provision or federal or state due process provisions); Real v. Kim,
112 Ill. App. 3d 427, 445 N.E.2d 783 (1983) (holding medical mal-
practice statute does not violate state "special legislation" provi-
sion); Thornton v. Mono Mfg., 99 Ill. App. 3d 722, 425 N.E.2d 522
(1981) (holding products liability statute does not violate due
process).
Indiana
Scalf v. Berkel, Inc., Ind. App. -, 448 N.E.2d 1201
(1983) (holding products liability statute does not violate federal
equal protection or due process provisions); Beecher v. White,
_ Ind. App. -, 447 N.E.2d 622 (1983) (holding construc-
tion statute does not violate state or federal equal protection or
due process provisions or state "special legislation" or open courts
provisions); accord Braswell v. Flintkote Mines, Ltd., 723 F.2d 527
(7th Cir. 1983); Pitts v. Unarco Indus. Inc., 712 F.2d 276 (7th Cir.
1983) (applying Indiana law to uphold products liability statute on
due process and equal protection grounds).
Iowa
Fitz v. Dolyak, 712 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding Iowa
medical malpractice statute does not violate due process or equal
protection).
Kansas
Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 230 Kan. 115, 631 P.2d 222
(1981) (holding medical malpractice statute does not violate state
equal protection or special legislation provisions).
Kentucky
Carney v. Moody, 646 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1982) (holding construc-
tion statute does not violate state open courts provision); accord
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Ball Homes, Inc. v. Volpert, 633 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. 1982).
Louisiana
Crier v. Whitecloud, 455 So. 2d 1279 (La. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding medical malpractice statute does not violate state equal
protection, due process, or open courts provisions); accord, Valen-
tine v. Thomas, 433 So. 2d 289 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
Massachusetts
Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 437 N.E.2d 514 (1982) (hold-
ing construction statute does not violate federal or state due pro-
cess or equal protection provisions or state remedies provision).
Michigan
O'Brien v. Hazelet & Erdal, 410 Mich. 1, 299 N.W.2d 336
(1980) (holding construction statute does not violate federal or
state equal protection or due process provisions).
Minnesota
Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding
medical malpractice statute does not violate federal equal protec-
tion or due process provisions); Calder v. City of Crystal, 318
N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1982) (holding construction statute does not
violate federal or state equal protection or due process provisions).
Mississippi
Anderson v. Fred Wagner & Roy Anderson Jr., Inc., 402 So. 2d
320 (Miss. 1981) (holding construction statute does not violate
state open courts provision).
Missouri
Ross v. Kansas City Gen. Hosp. and Medical Center, 608
S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1980) (holding medical malpractice statute does
not violate federal or state due process or equal protection provi-
sions or state special legislation provision).
Montana
Reeves v. Mle Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647 (1976)
(holding construction statute does not violate federal equal protec-
tion or state open courts provisions).
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Nebraska
Colton v. Dewey, 212 Neb. 126, 321 N.W.2d 913 (1982) (hold-
ing malpractice statute does not violate federal equal protection,
state due process, access to courts, or special legislation
provisions).
Nevada
State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. All Elec., Inc., 99 Nev.
222, 660 P.2d 995 (1983) (holding construction statute violates fed-
eral and state equal protection provisions).
New Hampshire
Heath v. Sears, Roebuck, Inc., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288
(1983) (holding products liability statute violates federal and state
equal protection provisions); Henderson Clay Prods., Inc. v. Edgar
Woods & Assocs., Inc., 122 N.H. 800, 451 A.2d 174 (1982) (holding
construction statute violates federal and state equal protection
provisions).
New Jersey
Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662
(1972) (holding construction statute does not violate federal equal
protection or due process provisions or state special legislation
provision).
New Mexico
Terry v. New Mexico Highway Comm'n, 98 N.M. 119, 645
P.2d 1375 (1982) (holding construction statute does not violate
federal equal protection or state special legislation provisions, but
does violate due process); Armijo v. Tandyish, 98 N.M. 181, 646
P.2d 1245 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (holding medical malpractice stat-
ute does not violate federal equal protection or due process
provisions).
North Carolina
Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1984) (hold-
ing North Carolina medical malpractice statute does not violate
equal protection or state open courts provision); Hines v. Tenneco
Chems., Inc., 728 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding North Carolina
products liability statute does not violate state open courts provi-
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sion); Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E.2d
868 (1983) (holding construction statute does not violate federal or
state equal protection provisions or state open courts provision).
Ohio
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, Dykes, Goodenberger,
Bower & Clancy, 740 F.2d 1362 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding Ohio con-
struction statute does not violate federal or state due process or
equal protection provisions or state open courts provision). But see
Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 6 Ohio St. 3d 300, 452
N.E.2d 1337 (1983) (holding medical malpractice statute violates
state equal protection provision).
Oklahoma
Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143
(Okla. 1977) (holding construction statute violates federal equal
protection provision). The Oklahoma Legislature has since passed
a new statute, the constitutionality of which has not been decided.
Oregon
Davis v. Whiting Corp., 66 Or. App. 541, 674 P.2d 1194, peti-
tion for review denied, 297 Or. 82, 679 P.2d 1367 (1984) (holding
products liability statute does not violate federal due process or
equal protection provisions or state open courts provision); Joseph
v. Burns, 260 Or. 493, 491 P.2d 203 (1971) (holding construction
statute does not violate state remedy provision).
Pennsylvania
Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382
A.2d 715 (1978) (holding construction statute does not violate state
remedy or special legislation provisions).
Rhode Island
Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., - R.I. -, 471 A.2d
195 (1984) (holding products liability statute violates state open
courts provision).
South Carolina
Broome v. Truluck, 270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978) (hold-
ing construction statute violates federal and state equal protection
provisions).
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South Dakota
Daugaard v. Baltic Coop. Bldg. Supply Ass'n, 349 N.W.2d 419
(S.D. 1984) (holding construction and products liability statutes vi-
olate state open courts provision).
Tennessee
Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 730 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1984)
(holding Tennessee products liability statute does not violate fed-
eral equal protection or due process provisions); Mathis v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 719 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding Tennessee products
liability statute does not violate federal due process provision);
Harman v. Angus R. Jessup Assocs. Inc., 619 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn.
1981) (holding construction statute does not violate federal equal
protection or state open courts provisions); Harrison v. Schrader,
569 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. 1978) (holding medical malpractice statute
does not violate federal or state equal protection provisions or
state open courts provision).
Texas
Neagle v. Nelson, No. C-2576 (Tex. 1985) (available on
LEXIS, State library, Tex. file) (holding medical malpractice stat-
ute violates state open courts provision); accord Sax v. Votteler,
648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983); Sowders v. M. W. Kellogg Co., 663
S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (holding construction statute does
not violate due process, equal protection, or state access to courts
provisions); accord, Ellerbe v. Otis Elevator Co., 618 S.W.2d 870
(Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
Utah
Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah 1978) (holding medical
malpractice statute does not violate due process); Good v. Chris-
tensen, - Utah -, 527 P.2d 223 (1974) (holding construction
statute is not unconstitutional).
Washington
Duffy v. King Chiropractic Clinic, 17 Wash. App. 693, 565
P.2d 435 (1977) (holding medical malpractice statute does not vio-
late federal or state equal protection provisions or state special leg-
islation provision); Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central
Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503 P.2d 108 (1972)
(holding construction statute does not violate federal equal protec-
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tion provision or state special legislation provision).
Wisconsin
United States Fire Ins. Co. v. E. D. Wesley Co., 100 Wis. 2d
59, 301 N.W.2d 271 (1980) (holding amended version of construc-
tion statute, which had been held violative of equal protection in
Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D. Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225
N.W.2d 454 (1975), does not violate state or federal due process
provisions).
Wyoming
Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980)
(holding construction statute violates state special legislation
provision).
